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Abstract
Our research addresses fundamental long-standing concerns in the compensating wage
differentials literature and its public policy implications: the econometric properties of estimates
of the value of statistical life (VSL) and the wide range of such estimates from about $0.5 million
to about $21 million. We address most of the prominent econometric issues by applying panel
data, a new and more accurate fatality risk measure, and systematic selection of panel estimator
in our research. Controlling for measurement error, endogeneity, individual heterogeneity, and
state dependence yields both a reasonable average level and narrow range for the estimated value
of a statistical life of about $5.5–$7.5 million.

JEL Code J17, I12

1. Introduction
The value of statistical life (VSL) concept based on econometric estimates of wagefatality risk tradeoffs in the labor market is well established in the economics literature. The
method provides the yardstick that the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires
agencies to use in valuing fatality risks reduced by regulatory programs.1 More recently, VSL
estimates have also provided the basis for assessing the mortality costs of the Iraq war (Wallsten
and Kosec 2005, Bilmes and Stiglitz 2006). Notwithstanding the wide use of the VSL approach,
there is still concern over excessively large/small estimates and wide range of the estimates for
VSL. Our research demonstrates how using the best available data and econometric practices pins
down the estimated value of a statistical life.
The apparent instability of the labor market VSL estimates has generated a series of
prominent econometric controversies regarding the approach (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). As
emphasized by Black and Kniesner (2003) and Ashenfelter (2006), there is an important
measurement error issue. Does the fatality rate variable indicate the actual risk posed by the
worker’s job? Because hedonic equilibrium reflects tangencies of firms’ market offer curves with
a worker’s highest attainable expected utility locus, whether workers perceive the risk is an issue
as well. Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) also note that there may be important omitted
variables that bias VSL estimates.2 Chief among possible omitted variables for labor market
studies may be measures of worker productivity and safety-related productivity, each of which
has been of concern in the theoretical literature.3 Finally, labor market studies are based on
fatality risk measures that may not be exogenous. Using data from outside the labor market,
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004a, b) overcome the endogeneity problem using a possibly more
exogenous event -- the state’s choice of the highway speed limit -- as their instrumental variable.
There is no comparable labor market instrument, although there are previously unused
econometric techniques available if one has micro panel data.

Almost all previous labor market studies have relied on cross-section wage regressions
for which a fatality risk measure involving substantial measurement error is matched to the
worker. Our research confronts the several econometric issues of critical interest: measurement
error and endogeneity, omitted variables, heterogeneity, and state dependence. Using panel data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a new and more refined fatality risk measure, plus a
variety of estimation methods we show how applying state-of-the-art econometric practices pins
down the estimated value of a statistical life.
We address the pivotal issue of measurement error in several ways. The fatality risk
variable is not by industry or occupation alone, as is the norm in almost all previous studies, but
is a refined measure based on 720 industry-occupation cells. We use one-year and three-year
averages to reduce the influence of random year-to-year fluctuations.4 Because the fatality rate
data are available by year, workers in our panel who do not change jobs potentially can have a
different fatality risk in different years. In contrast, the only previous panel-based labor market
VSL study used the same occupational risk measure for all years, so that all possible variation in
risk was restricted to job changers (Brown 1980). Our research also explores using adjacent year
first differences as well as long differences, for which the influence of measurement error should
be less pronounced. We also examine how instrumental variable estimates for each approach
attenuates measurement error and endogeneity bias. Finally, our dynamic first-difference
estimates make it possible to include longer-run worker adaptations to changes in their job risk
level that may occur if they are not perfectly informed about the risk initially.
We infer the role of omitted variables through a variety of estimation approaches, most of
which exploit the capabilities of our large panel data set. Fixed effect models sweep out the
individual effects for both the adjacent year differences and the long differences. In each
instance, we use the pertinent instrumental variables estimator, following Griliches and Hausman
(1986). Our work also distinguishes job movers from job stayers. We find that most of the
2

variation in risk and most of the evidence of positive VSLs stems from people changing jobs
across occupations or industries possibly endogenously rather than from variation in risk levels
over time in a given job setting.
Our econometric refinements using panel data have a substantial effect on the estimated
VSL levels. They reduce the estimated VSL by more than 75 percent from the implausibly large
cross-section PSID-based VSLs of $18–$21 million. We demonstrate how careful econometric
practice narrows the estimated value of a statistical life from about $0.5–$21 million (Viscusi
and Aldy 2003) to only about $5.5–$7.5 million, which greatly clarifies the choice of the proper
VSL to be used in policy evaluations.
2. Canonical Econometric Framework
We begin with an econometrically familiar representation of the hedonic wage equation
used in the value of statistical life literature. For worker i (i = 1,…,N) in industry j (j = 1,…,J)
and occupation k (k = 1,…,K) at time t (t = 1,…,T) the hedonic tradeoff between the wage and
risk of fatality is

ln wijkt = α 0i + α1π jkt + X ijkt β + δ t + uijkt ,

(1)

where ln wijkt is the natural log of the hourly wage rate and πjkt is the industry and occupation
specific fatality rate; Xijkt is a vector containing dummy variables for the worker’s one-digit
occupation (and industry in some specifications), region of residence, plus the usual
demographic variables: worker education, age, race, marital status, and union status. Finally, δ t
is a vector of time effects, and uijkt is an error term allowing an individual-specific effect plus
conditional heteroskedasticity and within industry by occupation autocorrelation.5
2.1 Measurement Error, Heterogeneity, and State Dependence

Standard panel-data estimators permitting latent worker-specific heterogeneity through
person-specific intercepts in (1) are the deviation from time-mean (within) estimator and the
3

time-difference (first-differences) estimator. The fixed effects include all person-specific timeinvariant differences in tastes and all aspects of productivity, which may be correlated with the
regressors in X. The two estimators yield identical results when there are two time periods and
when the number of periods converges towards infinity. With a finite number of periods (T > 2),
estimates from the two different fixed-effects estimators can diverge due to possible nonstationarity in wages, measurement error, or model misspecification (Wooldridge 2002). Because
wages from longitudinal data on individuals have been shown to be non-stationary in other
contexts (MaCurdy 1982; Abowd and Card 1989), we adopt the preferred first-difference model
as a baseline.
The first-difference model eliminates any time-invariant effect by estimating the changes
over time in hedonic equilibrium
Δ ln wijkt = α1Δπ ijk + ΔX ijkt β + δ%t + Δuijkt ,

(2)

where Δ refers to the first-difference operator and δ%t is a re-normalized vector of time dummies
(Weiss and Lillard 1978).
The first-difference model could exacerbate errors-in-variables problems relative to the
within model (Griliches and Hausman (1986). If the fatality rate is measured with a classical
error, then the first-difference estimate of α̂1 may be attenuated relative to the within estimate.
An advantage of the regression specification in (2), which considers intertemporal changes in
hedonic equilibrium outcomes, arises because we can use so-called wider (2+ year) differences.
If Δ ≥ 2 then measurement error effects are mitigated in (2) relative to within-differences
regression (Griliches and Hausman 1986). As discussed in the data section below, we
additionally address the measurement error issue in the fatality rate by employing multi-year
averages of fatalities. For completeness we also note how the first-difference estimates compare
to the within estimates.
4

Lillard and Weiss (1979) demonstrated that earnings functions may not only have
idiosyncratic differences in levels but also have idiosyncratic differences in growth. To correct
for wages that may not be difference stationary as implied by equation (2) we estimate a double
differenced version of (2) that is
%
Δ 2 ln wijkt = α1Δ 2π ijk + Δ 2 X ijkt β + δ%t + Δ 2uijkt ,

(3)

%
where Δ 2 = Δ t − Δ t −1 , commonly known as the difference-in-difference operator, and δ%t is a renormalized vector of time dummies. We also estimate a dynamic version of (2) by adding γΔ ln
wijkt−1 to the right-hand side and using the first-difference instrumental variables estimator
recommended in Arellano (1989). Our dynamic estimator uses the two-period lagged level of the
dependent variable as the identifying instrument for the one-period lagged difference in the
dependent variable. The lagged dependent variable controls for additional heterogeneity and
serial correlation plus sluggish adjustment to equilibrium (state dependence). We therefore
compare the estimated short-run effect, α̂1 , to the estimated long-run effect, αˆ1 /(1 − γˆ ) , and their
associated VSLs.
2.2 Comparison Estimators

If E[uijk | π jk , X ijk ] = 0 , which is the standard zero conditional mean assumption of least
squares regression, then OLS estimation of the hedonic equilibrium in (1) using pooled crosssection time-series data is consistent. If the zero conditional mean assumption holds, which is
unlikely to be the case, then the two basic estimators frequently employed with panel data, the
between-groups estimator and the random-effects estimator, will yield consistent coefficient
estimates.
The between-groups estimator is a cross-sectional estimator using individuals’ timemeans of the variables
5

ln wijk = α 1π jk + X ijk β + δ + uijk ,
with ln wijk =

(4)

1 T
∑ ln wijkt and other variables similarly defined. A potential advantage of the
T t =1

between-groups estimator is that measurement-error induced attenuation bias in estimated
coefficients may be reduced because averaging smoothes the data generating process. Because
measurement error affects estimates of the VSL (Black and Kniesner 2003; Ashenfelter 2006),
the between-groups estimator is likely to provide improved estimates of the wage-fatal risk
tradeoff over OLS estimates of equation (1).
The random-effects model differs from the OLS model in (1) by specifying components
of the overall error as uijkt = μi + υijkt , where μi is person-specific and time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity, and υijkt is an independently and identically distributed random error component.
The random-effects estimator is a weighted average of the between-groups variation and the
within-groups variation.
Consistency of the random-effects estimator requires

E[ μi | π jkt , X ijkt ] = 0

and

E[υijkt | π jkt , X ijkt ] = 0 . The first condition implies that the time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity is randomly distributed in the population. The implication is that selection into
possibly risky occupations and industries on the basis of unobserved productivity and tastes is
purely random across the population of workers. Although both the pooled least squares and
between-groups estimators remain consistent in the presence of random heterogeneity, the
random-effects estimator will be more efficient because it accounts for person-specific
autocorrelation in the wage process.
Finally, suppose that selection into a particular industry and occupation is not random
with respect to time-invariant unobserved productivity and risk preferences. In the non-random
selection case, estimates of VSL based on the pooled cross-section, between-groups, or random-
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effects estimators will be biased and inconsistent; the IV first-differences and double-differences
estimators in equations (2) and (3) and the IV dynamic first-difference estimator can be
consistent despite non-random job switching.
2.3 Research Objective

The focal parameter of interest in each of the regression models we estimate is α̂1 , which
is used in constructing estimates of the value of a statistical life. Accounting for the fact that
fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is about 2000 hours, the
estimated value of a statistical life at the mean level of wages is
⎡ ∂wˆ ˆ
⎤
VSL = ⎢(
= α1 × w) × 2000 × 100, 000 ⎥ .
⎣ ∂π
⎦

(5)

Although the VSL function in (5) can be evaluated at various points in the wage distribution,
most studies report only the mean effect. To highlight the differences in estimates of the VSL
with and without controls for unobserved individual differences, we follow the standard
convention of focusing on VSL in our estimates presented below. Our primary objective is to
examine how following systematic econometric practices for panel data models reduces the
estimated range and pins down VSL.
3. Data and Sample Descriptions

The main body of our data come from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households since
1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off into new
families.

7

3.1 PSID Sample

The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in the
random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the oversample of
the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino sub-sample. The male
heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at some point in the previous
calendar year, (ii) are not permanently disabled or institutionalized, (iii) are not in agriculture or
the armed forces, (iv) have a real hourly wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per
hour, and (v) have no missing data on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation.
Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every other year interviewing. For consistent
spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves. We
do not require individuals to be present for the entire sample period; we have an unbalanced
panel where we take missing values as random events.6 Our sample filters yield 2,106 men and
7,928 person-years. About 40 percent of the men are present for all five waves (nine years);
another 25 percent are present for at least four waves.
The focal variable from the PSID in our models of hedonic labor market equilibrium is
the hourly wage rate. For workers paid by the hour the survey records the gross hourly wage rate.
The interviewer asks salaried workers how frequently they are paid, such as weekly, bi-weekly,
or monthly. The interviewer then norms a salaried worker's pay by a fixed number of hours
worked depending on the pay period. For example, salary divided by 40 is the hourly wage rate
constructed for a salaried worker paid weekly. We deflate the nominal wage by the personal
consumption expenditure deflator for 2001 base year. We then take the natural log of the real
wage rate to minimize the influence of outliers and for ease of comparison with others’
estimates.
The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a quadratic in
age, dummy indicators for region of country (northeast, north central, and west with south the
8

omitted region), race (white = 1), union status (coverage = 1), marital status (married = 1), and
one-digit occupation. Table 1 presents summary statistics.
3.2 Fatality Risk Measures

We use the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit occupation group.
We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown of 72 two-digit SIC code
industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After constructing codes for two-digit
industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then matched each worker to the relevant
industry-occupation fatality risk. We constructed a worker fatality risk variable using proprietary
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for
1992–2002.7
The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related
fatalities. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and medical examiner reports.
In each case there is an examination of the records to determine that the fatality was in fact a jobrelated incident.
We focus on two measures of fatal risk, which differ according to the numerator. The
first measure simply uses the number of fatalities in each industry-occupation cell. The second
measure uses a three-year average of fatalities surrounding each PSID survey year (1992–1994
for the 1993 wave, 1994–1996 for the 1995 wave, and so on). The denominator for each measure
used to construct the fatality risk is the number of employees for that industry-occupation group
in survey year t. Both of our two measures of the fatality risk are time-varying because of
changes in both the numerator and the denominator.8
We expect there to be less measurement error in the 3-year average fatality rates relative
to the annual rate because the averaging process will reduce the influence of random fluctuations
in fatalities as well as mitigate the small sample problems that arise from many narrowly defined
9

job categories. We also expect less reporting error in the industry information than in the
occupation information, so even our annual measure should have less measurement error than if
the worker’s occupation were the basis for matching (Mellow and Sider 1983, Black and
Kniesner 2003). Table 1 lists the means and standard deviations for both fatality risk measures.
The sample mean fatality risk for the annual measure is 5.7/100,000. As expected, the variation
in the annual measure exceeds that of the 3-year average.
Our research also avoids a problem plaguing past attempts to estimate the wage-fatal risk
tradeoff with panel data. If the fatality rate is an aggregate by industry or occupation the within
or first-difference transformation leaves little variation in the fatality risk measure to identify
credibly the fatality parameter. Most of the variation in aggregate fatal risk is of the so-called
between-groups variety (across occupations or industries at a point in time) and not of the
within-groups variety (within either occupations or industries over time). Although cross-group
variation exceeds within-group variation (Table 2), the within variation in our more disaggregate
measures is sufficiently large (60–70 percent of the between variation) so that it may be feasible
to identify the fatal risk parameter and VSL in our panel data models. Finally, we also address the
issue that cross-group variation in fatality risk may be generated by endogenous job switching.
4. Wage Equation Estimates

Although we suppress the coefficients for ease of presentation, each regression model we
use controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union
status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. Because of the substantial heterogeneity of
jobs in different occupations, the regressions include a set of one-digit occupation dummies. The
equations do not include industry dummy variables as well because doing so would introduce
multicollinearity with respect to the fatality risk variable, which involves matching workers to
fatality risk based on their industry and occupation. Indeed, including two-digit industry
dummies in addition to occupation controls will remove all variation in the fatality risk variable.
10

Reported standard errors are clustered by industry and occupation and are also robust to the
relevant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note that our first-difference regressions
automatically net out the influence of industry and other job characteristics that do not change
over time, and the double-difference regressions net out additional trending factors.
4.1 Focal Estimates from Panel Data

The baseline first-difference estimates from equation (2) appear in Table 3. The results
are our basic attempt to address systematically not only latent heterogeneity and possibly trended
regressors, but also measurement error. Comparing estimates both down a column and across a
row reveals the effect of measurement error. The results are reasonable from both an
econometric and economic perspective and provide the comparison point for our core research
issue, which is how badly VSL can be mis-represented if certain basic econometric issues are
mis-handled.
The VSL implied by the coefficient for the annual fatality rate in Table 3 using the sample
mean wage of $21 is $6.1 million. We emphasize that a novel aspect of our research is that it
helps clarify the size of possible measurement error effects. If measurement error in fatality risk
is random it will attenuate coefficient estimates and should be reduced by letting the fatality rate
encompass a wider interval. Compared to VSL from the more typical annual risk measure, the
estimated VSL in Table 3 is about 20 percent larger when fatality risk is a three-year average.
The last two columns of Table 3 report the results for widest possible differences
( ln w2001 − ln w1993 ) as well as difference-in-differences from equation (3), which should remove
possible spurious estimated effects from variables that are not difference stationary. The main
message from Table 3 is that correcting for measurement error enlarges estimated VSL, and that
even for the relatively basic panel models using differencing, the range for VSL is not large,
$5.8–$7.6 million.
11

An issue seldom addressed in panel wage equations producing VSL is endogeneity of the
fatality change regressor, which may result from dynamic decisions workers make to change jobs
(Solon 1986, 1989). Some changes in fatality risk will occur because of within industryoccupation cell changes and others will occur because workers switch industry-occupation cells.
We examine the practical importance for panel based estimation in Table 4, where we stratify the
data by whether Δπ is due to within or between cell changes, including immediately before and
after a worker changes cell. The main econometric contribution to compensating differentials for
fatality risk comes from workers who generate differences in risk over time by switching
industry-occupation cells. The difference in estimated VSL in Table 4 comes from the fact that

σ π is 2–3 times larger for switchers (see Table 2). There is too little within-cells variation to
t

reveal much of a compensating differential. More important, because so much of the variation
producing the wage differential in Table 3 comes from job changers, and the variation for
switchers may be related to wages, it is important to treat Δπ as endogenous.
The estimated range for VSL narrows even further when we allow for endogeneity and
instrument the change in fatality risk. The instrumental variables regressions in Table 5 control
for both classical measurement errors and endogeneity. We limit the focus to the annual fatality
rate so as to have enough lagged fatality and fatality differences as instruments. The main result
is a very narrow range of estimated VSL, $5.6–$5.7 million when we instrument the annual
change in fatality risk.
Table 6 presents our final focal panel results from dynamic first-difference regressions.
The short-run effects from the dynamic model appear in column 1 and the long-run (steady state)
estimates appear in column 2. Note that our first-differences estimator focuses on changes in
wages in response to changes in risk. The mechanism by which the changes will become
reflected in the labor market hinges on how shifts in the risk level will affect the tangencies of
the constant expected utility loci with the market offer curve. To the extent that the updating of
12

risk beliefs occurs gradually over time, which is not unreasonable because even release of the
government risk data is not contemporaneous, one would expect the long-run effects on wages of
changes in job risk to exceed the short-run effects. Limitations on mobility will reinforce a
lagged influence (state dependence). As one would then expect, the steady state estimates of VSL
after the estimated three-year adjustment period in the results in Table 6 are larger than the shortrun estimates. The difference between the short-run and long-run VSL is about $7–8 million
versus $10–11 million. Again, the range of VSL estimates is not wide when panel data are used
with state-of-the-art estimators appropriate for the issues of endogeneity, measurement error,
latent heterogeneity and possible state dependence.
4.2 Comparison Results From Cross-Section Estimators

Table 7 presents the comparison models, which flesh out the most salient econometric
issues when compared to the focal results from Tables 3–6 just presented.
One problematic result in the literature is the regularly occurring large value for VSL
when the PSID is used as a cross-section (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). Notice that the cross-section
estimators in columns 1 and 2 produce large implied VSLs, which also have a much numerically
larger range than the panel estimates, $16–22 million.
In contrast, column 3 of Table 7 reports estimates from the panel random-effects
estimator. Recall that the random-effects estimator accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, which
is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed covariates. It is fairly common in labor-market
research to reject the assumption of no correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and
observed covariates; we find a similar rejection here. This implies that the simple fixed effects
within estimator in the last column is preferred over the simple random effects estimator, with an
estimated VSL of about $5.5 million. Allowing for the possibility of unobserved productivity and
preferences for risk, even if it is improperly assumed to be randomly distributed in the
population, reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent relative to a model that ignores latent
13

heterogeneity (the pooled least squares estimates). The difference in estimated VSL with versus
without latent individual heterogeneity in the model is consistent with the theoretical prediction
in Shogren and Stamland (2002) that failure to control for unobserved skill results in a
potentially substantial upward bias in the estimated VSL. Taking into account the influence of
individual heterogeneity implies that, on balance, unobservable person-specific differences in
safety-related productivity and risk preferences are a more powerful influence than unobservable
productivity generally, which Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize to have the
opposite effect.
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Obtaining reliable estimates of compensating differential equations has long been
challenging because of the central roles of individual heterogeneity and state dependence in
affecting both the market offer curve and individual preferences. The often conflicting influence
of different unobservable factors has led to competing theories with predictions of different
direction. The first-difference estimation results reported here use more refined fatality risk
measures than employed in earlier studies, making it possible to control for measurement errors
and workplace safety endogeneity when examining the wage-fatality risk tradeoff. Comparison
of the various first-difference results with various cross-section estimates implies that controlling
for latent worker-specific heterogeneity reduces the estimated VSL by up to 75 percent and
narrows greatly the VSL range to about $5.5–$7.5 million.
The wide variation of VSL estimates in the literature also has generated concern that
underlying econometric problems may jeopardize the validity of those estimates. The range for
VSL in the existing literature is extremely wide, from $0.5 million to $21 million. Previous
studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics have often yielded extremely high VSL
estimates around $20 million. Earlier research did not control for the host of econometric
problems we address here. The econometrically most general first-difference estimates we report
14

range from $5.5 million to $7.5 million. Our research has resolved the econometric issues giving
rise to the very high/low levels and wide ranges of published VSL estimates. The disparate results
in previous studies may reflect the influence of omitted unobservable effects, among other
repairable econometric specification errors. Failure to address these underlying econometric
issues may have unduly muddled the policy debate over the use of VSL estimates in benefit
calculations for government policies.
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Endnotes

1.

See U.S. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17,
2003). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.

2.

The Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) examination of VSL levels implied by driving
behavior provides an ingenious solution to the omitted variables and risk endogeneity
issue. They use state-level decisions about highway speed limits as their instrument.
However, both the underlying driving time saved by higher speed limits and the state’s
decision to pass the legislation could also be influenced by fuel economy concerns.
Driver decisions and the probability that a state adopts a particular speed limit may
depend on more than the safety dimension of the choice.

3.

Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) hypothesize that unobserved worker productivity
biases VSL estimates downwards. Viscusi and Hersch (2001) examine safety-related
productivity, but do not offer any directional hypothesis regarding the induced bias.
Shogren and Stamland (2002) theorize that unobservable worker skill in promoting safety
leads VSL estimates to be too high, but their result stems from analysis of infra-marginal
workers who will not be captured in market evidence.

4.

The only previous use of the fatality rate data at our level of disaggregation and for
different periods of time is in Viscusi (2004). Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak (2006) also
used the 720 cell measure but not the multi-year averages.

5.

The econometric structure in (1) is different than Brown’s (1980) panel data model
where the job risk variable was the same in all years and was given by the 1967 Society
of Actuaries data, which provided information on overall mortality risks for people in 37
relatively high risk occupational groups and produced a VSL of only about $1.9 million.
Moreover, the time variation in risk in his model arose from changes in occupation over
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time. In contrast, our research uses a highly refined fatality risk measure for 720 industryoccupation cells for which there is variation across time as well as variation that arises as
workers change either their occupation or industry. Finally, we adopt a parametric
specification of the regression model representing hedonic equilibrium in (1) for
comparison purposes with the existing literature. An important emerging line of research
is how more econometrically free-form representations of hedonic labor markets
facilitates identification of underlying fundamentals, which would further generalize
estimates of VSL (Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim 2004).
6.

Ziliak and Kniesner 1999 show that if nonrandom attrition is present our differenced
model in (2) should sweep it out along with the other time-invariant factors.

7.

The fatality data can be obtained on CD-ROM via a confidential agreement with the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi
(2004).

8.

We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Current Population Survey, unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed
Industry and Occupation for 1993–2001.
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Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics

Real Hourly Wage
Log Real Hourly Wage
Age
Marital Status (1=Married)
Race (1=White)
Union (1=member)
Years of Schooling
Live in Northeast
Live in Northcentral
Live in South
Live in West

Mean
21.058
2.881
40.895
0.820
0.764
0.230
13.585
0.177
0.288
0.372
0.163

Standard
Deviation
13.352
0.570
8.450
0.384
0.425
0.421
2.216
0.382
0.453
0.483
0.370

One-Digit Industry Groups:
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation and Public Utilities
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Fire, Insurance, and Real Estate
Business and Repair Services
Personal Services
Entertainment and Professional Services
Public Administration

0.008
0.106
0.259
0.109
0.130
0.045
0.066
0.009
0.169
0.098

0.087
0.308
0.438
0.311
0.337
0.208
0.248
0.097
0.375
0.297

One-Digit Occupation Groups:
Executive and Managerial
Professional
Technicians
Sales
Administrative Support
Services
Precision Production Crafts
Machine Operators
Transportation
Handlers and Labors

0.187
0.162
0.058
0.032
0.066
0.086
0.207
0.078
0.080
0.045

0.390
0.368
0.234
0.177
0.248
0.280
0.405
0.268
0.272
0.208

Annual Fatality Rate (per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate (per 100,000)

5.681
5.543

8.849
8.319

Number of Men = 2,106
Number of Person Years = 7,928
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Table 2: Between and Within Group Variation for Industry by Occupation Fatality Rates

Overall
Standard
Deviation

Between Group
Standard
Deviation

Within
Group
Standard
Deviation

8.849

7.609

5.120

8.319

7.509

4.413

8.695

9.039

2.382

8.460

9.094

1.491

Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

8.914

6.708

5.913

8.258

6.491

5.179

Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

9.002

7.368

5.532

8.150

6.911

4.657

Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)

Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
3-Year Fatality Rate
(per 100,000)
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Table 3: First-Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
Number of Observations

Original Static
First Difference
Estimates

First-Difference
Estimator for
2001minus1993

Difference in
Differences
Estimator

1.4425
(0.4175)

1.6646
(1.3584)

1.5553
(0.5091)

6.1

7.0

6.6

1.7531
(0.5276)

1.3834
(1.4344)

1.7979
(0.6142)

7.4

5.8

7.6

5242

1255

3373

Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of
schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To
construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.
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Table 4: Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff by Job Change Status

Never Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
Number of Person-Years
Ever Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
Number of Person-Years
Only When Change Industry-Occupation
Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Static First-Difference

First-Difference Estimator
for 2001 minus 1993

0.3306
(1.2132)

-0.1188
(2.8783)

1.4

−0.5

-0.5653
(2.2522)

2.1041
(3.9626)

−2.4

8.9

1493

330

1.5483
(0.4473)

1.9423
(1.4353)

6.5

8.2

1.8660
(0.5352)

1.4322
(1.5141)

7.9

6.0

3749

925

1.7252
(0.4996)

1.7662
(1.4580)

7.3

7.4

2.0045
(0.5604)

1.3121
(1.5303)

8.4

5.5

Number of Person-Years
1033
745
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series crosssection estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-byoccupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for
region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using
equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.

21

Table 5: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

First-Difference IV
Estimator, t−1 and t−3
Fatality as Instruments

First-Difference IV
Estimator, Lag Differenced
Fatality as Instrument

1.3377
(0.6676)

1.3417
(0.6677)

5.6

5.7

Implied VSL ($Millions)

First Stage Results
t−1 fatality rate

0.6528
(0.0114)

t−3 fatality rate

−0.6512
(0.0113)

(t−1 rate) − (t−3 rate)

0.6520
(0.0103)

R2

0.54

0.54

Number of Observations
5242
5242
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and within industry-by-occupation autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years
of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year
effects. First stage regressions include all exogenous explanatory variables in addition to the noted
instruments. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in the table are divided by
1,000.
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Table 6: Dynamic First Difference Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff
Dynamic First-Difference Estimates
with lag wage instrumented

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Short-Run
Effect

Long-Run Effect

1.7583
(0.5390)

2.4825
[0.0024]

7.4

10.5

1.8154
(0.6629)

2.5623
[0.0088]

7.6

10.8

Number of Observations
3373
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses and p-values of the null hypothesis that the long-run effect is zero
are recorded in square brackets. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation
autocorrelation. Models control for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital status, union
status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. One and two year lags of the independent variables, except for the
fatality rates, are included as instruments for the lag wage. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the coefficients in
the table are divided by 1,000.
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Table 7. Cross Section and Panel Data Estimates of Wage-Fatal Risk Tradeoff

Annual Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)
3-Year Fatality Rate x 1,000

Implied VSL ($Millions)

Pooled Cross
Section Time
Series Estimator

Between-Group
Estimator

Random-Effects
Estimator

Fixed-Effects
Estimator

3.8702
(0.9972)

5.2443
(1.5944)

1.7401
(0.5185)

1.2498
(0.5382)

16.3

22.1

7.3

5.3

4.3338
(1.0316)

5.0506
(1.5811)

2.0445
(0.6074)

1.3352
(0.6452)

18.3

21.3

8.6

5.6

Number of Observations
7928
2106
7928
7737
Notes: Standard errors are recorded in parentheses. Standard errors for the pooled times series cross-section
estimator and the first difference estimator are robust to heteroskedasticity and within industry-by-occupation
autocorrelation. Each model controls for a quadratic in age, years of schooling, indicators for region, marital
status, union status, race, one-digit occupation, and year effects. To construct the VSL using equation (5) the
coefficients in the table are divided by 1,000.
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